Wednesday, July 09, 2008
Microsoft to Partners: We Still Don't Get SaaS
Chris Barbin
The on-premise titans trying to transition to on-demand face considerable challenges, well-documented in this blog and elsewhere. One of the most significant mistakes companies make trying to transition is pursuing a "hybrid" strategy. We've watched SAP and Oracle stumble into all sorts of problems trying to seek the middle ground, and now it seems Microsoft wants to join the party. Recently we were invited to listen to Microsoft's new CRM pitch , designed to recruit existing Salesforce.com partners. The pitch centers on a benign-sounding notion, the "power of choice" (see screenshot at left). Microsoft's lack of a choice (on-premise vs. SaaS) is the core issue. Choice when used in the context of technology architecture typically points to a vendor with a conflicted or transitional strategy. They're not quite ready to make the full commitment, so they spread their attention, development, marketing, and operations resources across fundamentally different paradigms.
What is deemed a choice actually represents a company trying to provide two conflicted models. Would you expect the company who sold you a backyard well to be able to offer a water utility? Would you expect the company who sold you a diesel generator to be able to offer you the benefits of a utility company? Nick Carr did a good job exploding the general myth of "choice" as an alternative to "progress" in The Big Switch, where he extends the electricity analogy to the current age of IT technologies.
We recently blogged, and were quoted in eWeek, saying that companies like Microsoft build "physically and emotionally closed solutions." This makes them unable to meet the challenges of tomorrow's enterprises.
A sign of this and that a company doesn't get SaaS is when it positions on-demand as a transition path to on-premise. This usually means:
- They are trying to not completely freak out their sales and management teams with the notion that their SaaS offering will cannibalize their traditional software.
- Their SaaS feature set is way behind their current on-premise product.
- They don't want a customer to think they made the wrong choice in selecting their on-premise product last year.
- They still don't get what SaaS means for their products, sales, operations and culture.
Microsoft was so brazen as to promote a financial incentive for partners who help customers move from on-demand to on-premise. Microsoft evidently considers this customer ripoff to be an "Opportunity for Success" for its partners (see second screenshot).
Again, the analogy to other utilities is useful: if a company tried to sell you the benefits of their electric or water grid as a "transition" to a bigger and better backyard well and generator, you'd have reason to question their commitment and ability to deliver the promised utility.
What could be more illustrative of this than Microsoft's attempts to put thin web front ends on on-premise solutions? Look at the screenshot below. This solution is really nothing more than diesel generator hooked up to a electric grid and pretending to be a utility (although this solution is apparently good enough for some other companies 'committed' to on-demand). At best this type of solutions is a stop gap measure; more likely, it demonstrates a lack of understanding for what is required to deliver SaaS to tomorrow's enterprise.
Labels: Google Apps, Microsoft Exchange, on-demand, oracle, SaaS, SAP
Thursday, July 03, 2008
Who is “fit” to provide enterprise apps?
Narinder Singh
The SaaS blogosphere has been abuzz these last couple of days discussing Sergey Solyanik’s assessment that Google’s culture is “not fit” for enterprise apps. We’ll say up front that Appirio runs our internal communication and collaboration using Google Apps, and have helped customers big and small do the same. We have been highly impressed with the quality, reliability, and rate of innovation in these tools, admire and respect the culture that created them, and have no hesitation calling them “enterprise ready.”
But we think that with all this talk about Google’s corporate culture, people are missing the real point—the culture of today’s traditional on-premise technology vendors is no longer “enterprise ready.”
Let me explain-- we believe that there is a cultural mismatch between the needs of today’s businesses and the cultures of traditional on-premise technology providers:
Today’s business needs agility, the culture of enterprise technology is anything but. As the global pace of change accelerates, business leaders need their IT staff and SI/ISV partners to be saying a lot more “yes” and a lot less “no.” It is no longer acceptable for an IT partner to make vague promises about a release 3 years out. When a CIO asked Hasso Plattner at the Churchill Club’s SaaS debate when he should move to SAP’s SaaS solutions, he was told to check back in “5 years, at least.” Is that what it means to have an “enterprise ready” culture?
Today’s business needs openness, the culture of enterprise technology is anything but. Traditional enterprise vendors have in their very DNA the idea that openness is dangerous to their business models. Businesses in all industries have accepted the notion of core vs. context—you focus on what you are good at and rely on seamless connections with a network of partners to provide the rest of your solution. Ironically, traditional enterprise software is one of the last industries to embrace this change. One of Hasso Plattner’s key lessons from SAP’s ill-fated experiment with SaaS is that “what is inside the system has to have a coverage level which is close to 100 percent,” he says. Openness will be there in name only—the intention is that everything you need is inside the system. Such a system has never existed, and never will. Is this what it means to have an “enterprise ready” culture?
So what does it mean to have an “enterprise-ready” culture? Of course, every traditional enterprise vendor wants to be agile and open, and many have made admirable strides in that direction, including SAP through its Developer Community and eSOA initiatives. And there is much more required to deliver enterprise solutions than agility and openness. There are the table stakes of reliability, security, and having a solution that meets a real business need. But today’s business requires IT partners with a culture that can do both-- be deeply rooted in agility and openness while delivering reliability, security, and business value. We think that Google and salesforce.com, the leaders in on-demand, have achieved this goal: Salesforce offers both trust.salesforce.com AND ideas.salesforce.com. Google offers highly innovative applications that scale like no traditional enterprise application will ever be able to.
But whether or not you agree with us that Google’s corporate culture is “enterprise ready," the real point is that its traditional on-premise competitors are most certainly not.
Labels: BusinessModels, Google, salesforce, SAP, Software, Software as a Service
Friday, May 02, 2008
Business by Delay - On-premise and on-demand are like oil and water for SAP
Narinder Singh
This week's announcement that SAP has delayed the rollout of its hosted midmarket “Business ByDesign” offering, and reduced expectations for the product, shed further light on the difficulties that on-premise software companies will have in delivering software as a service.
It's not that SAP leadership doesn’t “get” the opportunity, or isn’t “smart” enough to capture it. I spent three years in the Office of the CEO and know better. But it takes more than smarts to overcome fundamental conflicts between the traditional enterprise software business model and the on-demand business model. Many lessons only come with experience in the market, and SAP's approach to try to build it all at once (as explained by SAP founder Hasso Plattner in his debate with Marc Benioff) is completely off the mark.
For example:
- SAP locked 1,000 German engineers in an offsite location for five years to develop Business ByDesign. This follows the traditional model for building complex enterprise software. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), on the other hand, allows, and flourishes with, continual refinement based on customer usage. This affects every aspect of the development lifecycle.
- SAP built a system that was service oriented by design, but service delivery was an afterthought. SAP has never been in the service delivery business - this is an entirely new core competency, which happens to be at the core of how Salesforce and Google create value.
- To avoid cannibalization of its core products, SAP has tightly restricted the target market for ByDesign to a narrow set of geographies and industries. Successful SaaS solutions, on the other hand, are adopted by the marketplace in a bottom-up fashion and spread virally, leading to surprising adoption patterns that result in new opportunities, such as Salesforce being used for Service and Support.
This week's announcement is bad news for SAP—they’ve spent the last 2 years validating the potential of the SaaS market and now have to admit that it is far more difficult that then they anticipated to capture this opportunity.
Maybe SAP should take Benioff up on the challenge that he issued to Hasso at the Churchill Club, and build their next business application on Salesforce.com's Force.com platform. After all, SAP’s core expertise is business processes, not in the technology or infrastructure required to deliver software as a service.
Labels: business by design, on-demand, SaaS, SAP
Monday, March 03, 2008
Insights and Observations from the Pacific Crest On-Demand Conference
Narinder Singh
Last Thursday we had the pleasure of participating in the 3rd Annual Pacific Crest On-Demand Conference, the kickoff to Pacific Crest's Emerging Technology Summit. Salesforce.com CEO Marc Benioff invited us on stage during his keynote to illustrate how partners can harness the power of the Force.com platform, Visualforce and the AppExchange.
The participating companies covered the spectrum from large on-premise software companies such as EMC and SAP, who were describing their expansion into the newest "hot" market, to companies such as NetSuite, Salesforce.com and SuccessFactors that have built their business from the ground up with Software as a Service.
Interestingly, a number of companies there are in the process of trying to radically shift their business model from on-premise to on-demand, and they talked about the challenges. Most of these companies were small and nimble, which enabled them to make the transition cold-turkey. All were very clear that it wasn't an easy switch to make.
Can Companies Have Their SaaS Cake and Eat It Too?
Can companies successfully split their focus between traditional software and on-demand services?
This is a question we've been raising, skeptically, for quite some time in our blog. Our original Services 2.0 position paper in April 2007 described how the disruptive effects of SaaS will impact the economic models of on-premise software vendors. After a year of additional information and insight, it's even more apparent that treating SaaS as just another channel or product feature is a recipe for failure.
Spending a day with companies that have, or are attempting to make the switch from on-premise to SaaS reinforced the major challenges. IDeaS CEO Ed Booth gave a great presentation highlighting the challenges and upside of moving to an on-demand model. Concur Technologies has often been referenced as the best example of a company that successfully made the transition. Some issues raised by them and others included:
- One-time revenue hit: How do you manage through the decline in revenue growth when you move from an up-front license model to a monthly subscription model? With Wall Street and shareholders as panicky as they are today, this is a very difficult proposition for large public companies. Upfront licensing, even with longer term contracts, can drop by as much as 75%. As the Patricia Seybold Group has noted, As a company moves from perpetual licensing - where customers pay a relatively large, one-time licensing fee - to SaaS - where customers pay a relatively small, monthly license fee - financial performance slips in the short-term."
- Internal channel conflict: How do you manage the channel conflict that happens with your own partners, and even your own sales force, when offering both traditional license and on-demand software? Companies like EMC, with established business units focused on driving demand for SaaS or cloud computing, will have a serious challenge with this. The most reliable solution is to completely separate the businesses - which eliminates any synergy of having both models in the same company.
- Shifting to a "month by month" culture: How do you change the way you sell to and support customers when you have to earn their business every month instead instead of every few years when the next big version comes along? This is a huge cultural change for sales and support teams to make. SaaS companies require the culture of the web - where sites like eBay, Amazon, Google and others constantly monitor, serve and improve their customer's experience.
- Speeding up R&D: How do you adapt your product development processes to deliver an on-demand service? Successful on-demand vendors get the benefit of releasing new features quarterly, not every two or three years. When features are released, they are expected to work with other systems indefinitely. Salesforce.com still supports each of its 12 versions of its API. How many on-premise vendors can claim anything even close?
EMC, SAP, Microsoft and Oracle make it clear to customers and stockholders that their foray into SaaS or cloud computing is not a departure from their software strategies, but an expansion of it. They say things like "SaaS is just another delivery model," or "we're giving customers a choice." Yet they keep increasing the on-premise maintenance fees. SAP just increased its maintenance rate from 17% to 22% per year - an increase of 30%! This leads to one of two possible conclusions:
- The cost of supporting a growing legacy of capabilities keeps increasing, which eliminates the benefits of on-premise scale. Compare this to any internet company, where increased scale lowers cost and results in expanded services for customers.
- They are taking advantage of customers' inability to easily switch off of their on-premise software.
Traditional software companies - especially large ones - will certainly have to straddle the fence for a while. Yet the doubletalk and denial will not help in the transition. First, they must acknowledge the need to make a transition. Second, in many cases, dramatic actions, like separating SaaS products into completely independent business units or taking companies private to allow for transition, will be needed to make the change. It's likely that legacy companies will not switch until customers stop tolerating increasing TCO and diminishing innovation from their on-premise systems.
Labels: AppExchange, Concur Technologies, EMC, Force.com, IDeaS, on-demand, Pacific Crest, SaaS, salesforce.com, SAP, software-as-a-service